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PROBLEM AREAS IN WILL DRAFTING
UNDER NEW YORK LAW
PHILIP B. BLANK*
INTRODUCTION
Many of the difficulties experienced by attorneys in surro-
gate's practice can be traced directly to their own misguided efforts
in the preparation or drafting of wills. Interestingly, most of such
difficulties stem from but a few oft repeated errors. Of course, de-
fective draftsmanship readily may be emended during the life of a
testator. Nevertheless, executed wills frequently are not reviewed
by practitioners, and errors, although few in variety, may remain
undetected until probate.' Accordingly, it is incumbent upon prac-
titioners to be alert to those drafting problems which most fre-
quently frustrate their clients' testamentary desires. In order of
their frequency of occurrence, these errors include: (1) alterations
to executed wills; (2) poor grammar and sentence structure; (3)
failure to dispense with a fiduciary's bond; (4) failure to name suc-
cessor or substitute fiduciaries; (5) creation of testamentary trusts
which are violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities; (6) creation of
trusts which are invalid pursuant to the doctrine of merger; (7) at-
torney-draftsman named as beneficiary; and (8) unanticipated le-
gal consequences of joint and reciprocal wills.
This Article briefly will survey each of the above drafting con-
cerns. In addition, the Article will, when appropriate, suggest sim-
ple and efficacious measures designed to forestall most instances of
faulty draftsmanship. Of course, the author concedes that each of
the will-drafting problems discussed in the course of the Article
properly could be the subject of lengthy and independent treat-
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, B.S., Fordham University, 1956;
LL.B., Fordhan Law School, 1959. The author served an 11-year tenure as Law Assistant-
Referee in the Surrogate's Court of Westchester County. The author acknowledges the in-
valuable research assistance of Janet Alswanger Gochman in the preparation of this Article.
I In the words of Justice Crane, "[i]f as much effort were spent in preparing a will as is
devoted to either breaking or construing it, we would not have all these perplexing ques-
tions." In re Will of Watson, 262 N.Y. 284, 298, 186 N.E. 787, 790, modifying 237 App. Div.
625, 262 N.Y.S. 394 (lst Dep't 1933), modifying 144 Misc. 213, 258 N.Y.S. 755 (Sur. Ct.
Westchester County 1932).
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ment. Nevertheless, the author believes that a brief recitation of
those problems which most frequently work to confound the inten-
tions of testators is warranted.
Altering Executed Wills
Surely the most common, but nevertheless, most easily
averted will-drafting blunder is committed after execution of a
will. That is, handwritten changes made on testamentary instru-
ments by deletion, insertion, and correction. Such practice clearly
is prohibited by the Statute of Wills, which requires strict adher-
ence to the prescribed formalities of execution.2 Indeed, unless it
can be established that a handwritten change was made before or
during execution or, if made thereafter, that the formalities of exe-
cution were adhered to, the change will be legally ineffective.3
I The Statute of Wills was originally enacted in England in 1540. P. MEcama & T.
ATKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 138 n.1 (5th ed. 1961).
Under the original enactment, the sole requirement was that the will be in writing. Id. A
later statute extended the formalities to include the testator's signature and acknowledge-
ment in the presence of two witnesses. See id. at 138-39. The New York Statute of Wills,
which contains substantially the same provisions, requires the following: (1) the instrument
must be signed "at the end thereof by the testator or, in the name of the testator, by an-
other person in his presence and by his direction"; (2) the signing must take place before
two attesting witnesses and be accompanied by a declaration to the witnesses that he is
affixing his signature to his will; and (3) the witnesses must sign and affix their addresses to
the will. N.Y. EST., Powmts & TRusTs LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 1981).
Although not as extensive in qualifying its provisions, the Model Probate Code has es-
sentially the same requirements as the New York Statute, with the exception that the wit-
nesses' addresses are not necessary. L. SIms & P. BAsYE, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 47 (1946).
For a comprehensive examination of the Statute's appearance in America, see Rees, Ameri-
can Wills Statutes: I, 46 VA. L. Rav. 613 (1960).
1 N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 3-2.1(a)(1)(B) (McKinney 1981). Although, occa-
sionally, this provision has been given a construction consistent with its intention, but ap-
parently contrary to its letter, see In re Estate of Hall, 59 Misc. 2d 881, 882-83, 300
N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1969), New York courts traditionally have
required strict compliance with the formalities of will execution. See, e.g., In re Booth's
Estate, 127 N.Y. 109, 116, 27 N.E. 826, 827 (1891); In re Will of Inglis, 3 Misc. 2d 980, 981,
156 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (Sur. Ct. Broome County 1956). But see In re Will of Kiefer, 78 Misc.
2d 262, 264, 356 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522-23 (Sur. Ct. Yates County 1974) (liberal policy in con-
struing section 21(4) of the New York Decedent Estate Law, the predecessor to section 3-
2.1(4) of the New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law). See generally W. LEAcH, CASES AND
TEXT ON THE LAW OF WILLS (2d ed. 1947). This policy of strict compliance also has been
applied to the alterations provisions of the law of wills. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carner, 46
Misc. 2d 319, 320, 258 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980 (Sur. Ct. King's County 1965).
The requirements for altering a will previously were codified in section 34 of the Dece-
dent Estate Law. Id. It has since been replaced by the Estates, Powers & Trusts Law
(EPTL) section 3-4.1, which provides: "(1) A will or any part thereof may be revoked or
altered by: (A) Another will. (B) A writing of the testator clearly indicating an intention to
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Two New York cases are illustrative of the invalidity of unat-
tested alterations. In In re Estate of Lewandowski,4 the testator
altered his will approximately 2 years after its execution.5 The
change involved the addition of a legatee to those named in the
main paragraph of the will and was effected by inserting in ink the
would-be legatee's name.' The court held that "the attempted
unattested change in ink was not made by the testator in conform-
ity with the statute. Accordingly, [the] change is wholly ineffec-
tive . .. ." Similarly, in In re Will of Lewis,8 the testator exe-
cuted a typewritten will. Subsequently, he attempted to revoke
certain portions of the will by scribing an "X" across entire pages
and passages, drawing lines through words, and writing "VOID"
next to various provisions.9 Despite the fact that these changes pa-
tently evidenced the testator's change of heart, the court invali-
dated the alterations and admitted the original document to pro-
bate.10 In so doing, the court observed that the statute controlling
revocation and alteration of wills was "specific and unqualified and
[hence] is to be strictly construed."1 The lesson, therefore, is clear:
the practitioner and his testator-client must be fully aware that
unattested alterations simply are ineffectual.1 2
effect such revocation or alteration, executed with the formalities prescribed by this article
for the execution and attestation of a will [§ 3-2.1]." N.Y. EST., PowSs & TaUsTs LAw § 3-
4.1 (McKinney 1981). According to the statute, any alterations must comply with the same
statutory requirements that must be adhered to in an original execution of a will. 2 W.
Bows & D. BARKER, PAGE ON THE LAw OF WiLLs § 22.1 (3d ed. 1960).
" 60 Misc. 2d 1005, 304 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1969).
5 Id. at 1006-07, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
' Id. at 1007, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
7Id. at 1007, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 265-66.
8 79 Misc. 2d 610, 360 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1974).
9 Id. at 610-11, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 762-63. All of the alterations were made in ink, id., but
because they were made after execution of the will and were unwitnessed, the court held
that they failed to comply with section 3-4.1 of the New York Estates, Powers & Trust Law,
79 Misc. 2d at 613, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
10 Id. at 613, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
2 Id. at 611, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
12 The existence of an alteration to a will raises no presumption in law with respect to
when the alteration was made, In re Will of Steffenhagen, 77 Misc. 2d 624, 630-31, 353
N.Y.S.2d 361, 368, 369 (Sur. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1974), and the burden of proof con-
cerning the time of alteration is on the proponent. Id. If it is proven that the alteration was
made before execution, the will will be admitted to probate in its altered form. Id. at 625,
353 N.Y.S.2d at 364. Otherwise, the will may be probated without the alteration. Id. When,
however, the courts are confronted with an instrument whose alterations are unexplained or
unaccompanied by "persuasive evidence," difficulty and uncertainty result. Id. The court of
appeals, in Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N.Y. 145 (1884), shed some light on this issue:
[W]here an interlineation or erasure in a will is fair upon its face, and is entirely
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Poor Grammar and Sentence Structure in the Drafting of Wills
Wills containing grammatical errors, ambiguous phraseology,
and typographical errors are, perhaps, as many in number as those
whose content has been altered by unattested changes. In both
instances, of course, a testator's intentions may be thwarted.
Whereas unattested alterations to executed wills must be ignored
upon probate, inexact terminology and sentence structure may
lead to ambiguities of language sufficient to work a more subtle
unexplained, there being no circumstance whatever to cast suspicion upon it, it
would not be proper for any court to hold that the alteration was made after exe-
cution; but if there are any suspicious or doubtful circumstances growing out of
the mode of the alteration. . . all the. . . circumstances must be submitted as
questions of fact. . . in deciding whether the alterations were made before execu-
tion or not.
Id. at 153-54. A threshold issue, therefore, is whether an unexplained alteration is "fair upon
its face." Hoffman, Revocation of Wills and Related Subjects, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 220,
241 (1965). The court of appeals' failure to define when an alteration is "fair on its face,"
however, has caused many inconsistencies and difficulties in the application of the standard
by New York courts. See In re Will of Steffenhagen, 77 Misc. 2d 624, 627, 353 N.Y.S.2d 361,
365-69 (Sur. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1974).
The execution of multiple copies of a will, like alterations made after execution, also
may lead to unanticipated and undesirable consequences. Indeed, although multiple copies
may be thought of as a safeguard against loss or fraudulent destruction, P. MncHxM & T.
ATKINSON, supra note 2, at 443, the practice often has the opposite effect, for when a num-
ber of copies of an instrument are executed, all copies must be produced or their nonpro-
duction accounted for before any one paper may be probated, 1 B. BUTLER, NEW YORK
SURROGATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 251 (1950); See In re Will of Robinson, 257 App. Div. 405,
406-07, 13 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (4th Dep't 1939). Significantly, failure to account for any one
of the executed instruments after the testator's death raises a presumption of revocation. In
re Will of Heyward, 13 App. Div. 2d 671, 672, 213 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (2d Dep't) (Kleinfield,
J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 10 N.Y.2d 923, 179 N.E.2d 713, 223 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1961); In re
Will of Levin, 26 Misc. 2d 866, 866, 208 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1960); see
In re Will of Suarez, 281 App. Div. 870, 872, 119 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (1st Dep't 1953) (per
curiam). The presumption of revocation can be rebutted, see In re Will of Staiger, 243 N.Y.
468, 471-72, 154 N.E. 312, 313-14 (1926), by a showing that the copy not produced was
either in existence at the time of death or fraudulently destroyed. 2A WARRE's HEAToN,
SURROGATE'S COURTS § 180, 6(b) (G. Markuson rev. ed. 1978). The burden of proof is upon
the proponent of the produced copy. Id. at § 180, 6(a).
A corollary to the preferred practice of executing only one copy of a will is that a carbon
or photocopy should not be used as the executed instrument instead of the original or rib-
bon copy since such use raises a question as to whether the instrument from which the copy
was made also was executed. In re Estate of Lewis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1979, at 11, col. 2 (Sur.
Ct. Bronx County). Although the EPTL does not require the executed writing to be an
"original" or "ribbon copy," see N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 1981),
failure to use an original "is clearly not a preferred practice and is fraught with peril." In re
Estate of Lewis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1979, at 11, col. 2 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County). For a discus-
sion of cases in which carbon copies were held not to be barred from probate, see 2A WAR-
REN'S HEATON, supra, § 180, 1 6(b), at 31-120.
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contravention of testator intentions. Indeed, words treated as sy-
nonymous by the lay person may, in the course of a will construc-
tion proceeding, prove to be antonymous. The term "personal be-
longings," for example, has been held to be "an extremely broad
classification and, in the absence of restriction, may include most
of testator's personal property."1 3 In contradistinction, the term
"personal things" has been defined as "goods and items of prop-
erty having a more or less intimate relation to the person of the
possessor.' 1 4 Consequently, irrespective of whether the drafter of a
will intended the words "belongings" and "things" to be treated
synonymously, a converse inference may arise, for courts are
"bound to assume that each and every word.., was written for a
purpose."'15
Significantly, the true meaning of will provisions must survive
more than mere objective inspection by the courts. Such provi-
sions, indeed, must also withstand scrutiny by the "reader in bad
faith," that is, by a "disappointed heir who wants the will to read
in a way that would defeat the testator's intention."'" If, for in-
stance, a will provides that property should be "divided equally
between all of our nieces on my wife's side and my niece," and
there are ten nieces in all, a question arises as to the amount each
heir would be entitled to receive. Although, in Lefeavre v. Pen-
nington,7 the court held that use of the word "between" indicated
that the testator's niece was to receive one-half, 8 it is conceivable
that the testator wished his estate to be distributed to his nieces
on a pro rata basis. Surely, such ambiguity quite easily may be
avoided.
Failure to Dispense with Bond
Although the omission of a will provision dispensing with the
bond filing requirement of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act
13 In re Estate of Bloomingdale, 142 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (Sur. Ct. New York County
1955).
" In re Estate of O'Brien, 155 Misc. 803, 804, 280 N.Y.S. 679 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County
1934).
15 In re Will of Birdsell, 271 App. Div. 90, 94, 63 N.Y.S.2d 146, 150 (3d Dep't), a/f'd,
296 N.Y. 840, 72 N.E.2d 26 (1947); 3 B. BUTLER, supra note 12, § 1928. For additional
examples of judicial definition of words in a will, see 64 N.Y. Jur. Wills §§ 620-653 (1969 &
Supp. 1981).
16 H. WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 8 (2d ed. 1980).
17 217 Ark. 397, 230 S.W.2d 46 (1950).
I Id. at 398, 230 S.W.2d at 47.
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(SCPA) is neither as common nor as deleterious as unattested al-
terations and ambiguous drafting, it is, nevertheless, a frequent er-
ror. The filing of bond by administrators, trustees, and executors
acting in a trustee capacity is, of course, designed to shield inter-
ested parties from losses incurred in the course of estate adminis-
tration. 19 Nevertheless, given the sizable expense of bond premium
charges which would otherwise be exacted upon the estate, failure
to dispense with bond surely is an unwarranted oversight.
Fortunately, in the case of failure to dispense with the bond of
an executor, there is a statutory reprieve. Section 710(1) of the
SCPA provides that "[n]o bond shall be required of an executor
unless required by the will or by 806 or by this section."20 Accord-
ingly, the failure of the draftsman to dispense with the bond of an
executor need not prove too troublesome. Unfortunately, however,
there is no similar statutory relief in the case of failure to dispense
with the bond of a trustee or of an executor who is given trust
duties. Indeed, section 806 of the SCPA provides:
Whenever a testamentary trustee is appointed by will or order of
the court or an executor is appointed who is required to hold,
manage or invest real or personal property for the benefit of an-
other, he shall unless the will provides otherwise, execute and file
a bond.2'
In other words, bond is compulsory unless dispensed with by will
or unless a financial institution is appointed.22 Of course, section
801(1)(c) specifically provides that the amount of the bond shall be
fixed "[iun such amount as the court directs."2 Nevertheless, in
the overwhelming majority of cases, the court is obliged to fix a full
bond because of the presence of interested persons who are under
19 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 805 (McKinney 1967) (administrators), § 806 (McKinney
1967 & Supp. 1981-1982) (testamentary trustee and executors). Section 801 of the SCPA
provides for the method of fixing bond. For an executor or administrator, bond shall be
fixed at not less than the "[v]alue of all personal property receivable by the fiduciary," the
"estimated gross rents of real property receivable by the fiduciary for 18 months," or the
"[p]robable recovery in any cause of action prosecuted by the fiduciary." N.Y. SuR. CT.
PROc. AcT § 801(1)(a) (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1981-1982). For a testamentary trustee, it
shall be fixed at "such amount as the court directs." Id. § 801(1)(c); see In re Estate of
Bainbridge, 89 Misc. 2d 895, 897 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1975).
20 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT § 710(1) (McKinney 1967).
21 Id. § 806 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
22 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-a(5) (McKinney 1971).
22 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AT § 801(1)(c) (McKinney 1967).
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a disability.24 Indeed, if only one such interested person, legally in-
capable of consenting to a reduced bond, is present, the court will
be precluded from exercising its discretion as to the amount of the
bond required.2"
Failure to Name Successor of Substitute Fiduciaries
The failure to name successor or substitute fiduciaries is asso-
ciated with the problem of failure to dispense with bond. If the
unnamed fiduciary is an executor, an administrator c.t.a.2 6 must be
appointed pursuant to section 1418 of the SCPA27 and a bond
must be filed pursuant to section 805,28 unless properly dispensed
with as provided by that section. The amount of the bond will be
fixed by the court pursuant to section 801.29 If the unnamed fiduci-
ary is a trustee, section 80630 will control and a full bond usually
will be required. Because financial institutions are not required to
fie bonds, testators frequently will name a bank or trust company
as fiduciary."1 Notably, however, the appointment of a bank or
2 Persons under a disability include infants, incompetents, incapacitated persons, per-
sons unknown or whose whereabouts are unknown, and prisoners who fail to appear because
of confinement in a penal institution. N.Y. SURna CT. PROC. AT § 103(40) (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981).
25 Section 805 of the SCPA provides:
Before letters are issued to an administrator ... he shall execute and file a
bond provided, however, that where . . . acknowledged consents that a bond be
dispensed with or fixed at a reduced amount are executed and filed by all persons
interested in the estate the court may dispense with a bond or fix the amount at
such sum as will adequately protect the right of all creditors. If such consent be
fied by some but not all of the persons interested in the estate, such consent must
also specifically release any claim under the bond required and the court may fix
the amount at such sum as will adequately protect the rights of all creditors and
of the non-consenting persons interested.
Id. § 805(1) (McKinney 1967). Consents must be filed by all "persons interested," 2A WAR-
REN'S HEATON, supra note 12, at § 158, 3(b), that is, "person[s] entitled either absolutely
or contingently to share as beneficiary in the estate." N.Y. SuRI. CT. PREc. ACT § 103(39)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). It necessarily follows that if an "interested" person is legally
incapable of consenting, the bond cannot be discharged or reduced. See generally 2A WAR-
REN'S HEATON, supra note 12, at § 158, % 13.
28 "C.t.a." literally means "with the will annexed." N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1418,
commentary at 373 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1980-1981). The phrase denotes that the ad-
ministrator must distribute the property under the terms of the will. Id.
217 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT § 1418 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1980-1981).
28 Id. § 805 (McKinney 1967).
29 Id. § 801 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1980-1981).
30 Id. § 806.
21 The New York Banking Law provides that "[n]o bond or other security... shall be
required from any trust company ... appointed executor, administrator, guardian, [or]
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trust company in the will does not render it unnecessary to name
substitute or successor fiduciaries. Financial institutions can re-
nounce their appointments, 2 be removed,3  or resign. In short,
the naming of a financial institution as a fiduciary is no guarantee
that a bond will not be required.
Although the SCPA does provide some relief for a fiduciary
troubled by a bond requirement, 5 as a practical matter, the relief
is limited. Therefore, rather than relying upon the SCPA to rescue
probate from a precarious position, the careful draftsman should
avert the peril in the first instance by providing for substitute or
successor fiduciaries.36
Invalidation of Interests Due to Violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities
Aside from the failure to dispense with the bond of a trustee,
another common source of drafting errors in the trust field involves
trustee." N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-a(5) (McKinney 1971). This freedom is not absolute,
however, for the court may, upon proper application, require the posting of security "as to
the court ... shall seem proper." Id.
11 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT § 1417(1) (McKinney 1967).
33 Id. §§ 711-719 (McKinney 1967 & Suppl. 1980-1981).
31 Id. § 715 (McKinney 1967).
31 Section 803 provides that when circumstances render inexpedient the filing of a full
bond, the assets may be deposited with the county treasurer or bank. Id. § 803(1) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1980-1981). Thereupon, the court may fix the amount of the bond after consider-
ing the value of the remainder of the estate. Id. In addition, section 804 stipulates that if a
bank or trust company is named as cotrustee, the estate may be placed in its sole custody.
Id. § 804 (McKinney 1967).
' Related to the failure to name a successor or substitute fiduciary is the appointment
of ineligible testamentary guardians. Surely, effective appointment of a testamentary guard-
ian is of paramount importance to clients with infant children. Indeed, young parents are
deeply concerned with the care and custody of their children-perhaps more so than with
the disposition of their assets. Unfortunately, however, many attorneys give scant attention
to this aspect of will drafting, except to recognize that clients are vitally concerned with the
appointments. They often fail to recognize that there are legal as well as practical problems
involved with such appointments. The failure to recognize these considerations may not
only result in a legal entanglement, but may also completely frustrate a client's wishes. At-
torneys should, therefore, keep in mind two significant rules. First, pursuant to section 81 of
the Domestic Relations Law, parents are the only persons who may nominate testamentary
guardians. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1977). Second, if the infant has a living
parent who is not proven to be unfit or incompetent, that parent cannot be deprived of his
or her right to serve as guardian. See In re Bock, 280 N.Y. 349, 353, 21 N.E.2d 185, 186
(1939). Obviously, this latter factor is an important consideration when drawing the will of a
divorced or separated testator. Indeed, the testator may wish to preclude his ex-spouse from
managing the child's legacy. Hence, the attorney should consider fashioning a trust to man-
age the testator's bequest.
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the Rule Against Perpetuities. 7 In New York, the rule is possessed
of two aspects, 38 the first of which, codified in section 9-1.1(a)(2) of
the EPTL, deals with unlawful suspension of the power of aliena-
tion." A second aspect, found in section 9-1.1(b), deals with re-
" In 1697, a "perpetuity" was defined as "an estate unalienable, though all mankind
join in the conveyance." L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1211, at 91
(2d ed. 1956) (quoting Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229 (1697)). From this and similar state-
ments, the modem Rule Against Perpetuities was created, see id., and since has evolved to
state that "[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest," R. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPE-
Turrms § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
A principal concern of the rule is the point at which the interest vests. G.G. BOGERT &
G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 213, at 153 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). Hence, when A devises
an estate to "his own grandchildren to vest at the age of twenty-one," the rule is not vio-
lated, for the interests of the grandchildren will vest 21 years after "some life in being,"
namely, the life of A's own children. L. Slids & A. SmTH, supra, § 1223, at 108. When,
however, A devises an estate to B and B's heirs, "to begin from a day fifty years after testa-
tor's death," the rule is violated. R. GRAY, supra, § 201, at 191-92 n.3. For a concise overview
of the rule and its application, see Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. Rv. 638
(1938).
-" The New York rule was originally contained in sections 42 and 43 of the Real Prop-
erty Law and section 11 of the Personal Property Law. 7 WAREN'S HEATON, supra note 12,
§ 22, 2(b). In 1967, these provisions were combined and reenacted as section 9-1.1 of the
EPTL, see N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1, commentary at 168 (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981), so that both real and personal property are covered under the same provision. 7
WARREN'S HEATON, supra note 12, § 22, 1 2(b). In addition, the former provisions were
slightly revised in order to embrace present as well as future estates. N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1967) (Reviser's Notes). Presently, New York's statutory
rule is directed against both "suspension of absolute ownership," and "remoteness of vest-
ing." Banker's Trust Co. v. Topping, 180 Misc. 596, 599, 41 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1943). This duality perhaps had its origin in the common-law treatment of
perpetuity. Throughout its common-law history, "perpetuity" has been used to refer to (1)
"an inalienable or indestructible interest," and (2) "a remote executory or contingent future
interest." L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 37, § 1211, at 94. In fact, the reference to both of
these interests has led to a controversy as to the character of the rule. See R. GRAY, supra
note 37, §§ 1-4; L. SaMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 37, § 1222. Such academic dispute may
account for New York's statutory safeguard against both types of interest. See 45 N.Y. JuR.
Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 2, at 102-03 (1973).
1' N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(a)(2) (McKinney 1967). This provision
states, "[e]very present or future estate shall be void in its creation which shall suspend the
absolute power of alienation by any limitation or condition for a longer period than lives in
being at the creation of the estate and a term of not more than twenty-one years." Id.
(emphasis added). The term "absolute power of alienation" means "the power of conveying
an absolute fee." S. CHAPLIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, AND POSTPONEMENT
OF VESTING § 64 (1981). The test for satisfying this section is whether there are "lives in
being" who can convey an absolute fee, regardless of how many parties or how diverse the
property interests. Id. As long as their consolidation is an absolute fee, id., the property is
not withdrawn from the stream of commerce, prevention of which is the general policy un-
derlying the rule, Leach, supra note 37, at 640.
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moteness of vesting.40 Both elements must be considered when
drafting a trust instrument because an interest can be invalid
under the suspension rule while valid under the remoteness of
vesting rule.41 Moreover, the mere existence of a possibility that
the rule may be violated in either respect will, in and of itself, vio-
late the rule.42
Under either aspect of the rule, the period in which the inter-
est must either vest or be suspended is 21 years after lives in being
at the time of the creation of the interest.43 Because a testamen-
41 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 1967). This section provides
that no estate "shall be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after one or more lives in being at the creation of the estate and any period of gestation
involved." Id. (emphasis added). The term "must vest" does not mean the interest must be
certain to vest, for no contingency is certain. S. CHAPLIN, supra note 39, § 317. Rather, it
contemplates that the interest must be limited so as to either vest at the end of the term, or
by "the terms of its creation cease to be a possibility." Id.
41 See N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1, commentary at 168 (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981); 45 N.Y. JUR. Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 38 (1973).
42 In New York, the validity of the interest created by a will is to be determined as of
the testator's death. 3 H. JESSUP, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATES' COURTS IN THE
STATE OF NEW YORK § 2689 (E. Bohm ed. 1947). The courts do not consider facts which
occur after the inception of the will. Id. Therefore, at the time of the testator's death, the
requirements of the rule must be met, 45 N.Y. JuR. Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienta-
tion § 12, at 123, and the interest is void if it is at all possible that the interest might vest
after the statutory period. Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Common-Law
Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 355, 355 (1975). The policy of examining
facts which occur after the inception of the instrument in order to determine whether the
interest does, in fact, properly vest is known as the "wait and see" approach. L. SImEs & A.
SMITH, supra note 37, § 1230. Because such approach has been rejected in New York, the
property interest will stand or fall as of the instrument's inception. N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1, commentary at 168 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). In the words of the
court of appeals, "[ilt is settled beyond dispute that in determining whether a will has ile-
gally suspended the power of alienation, the courts will look to what might have happened
under the terms of the will rather than to what has actually happened since the death of the
testator." In re Fischer, 307 N.Y. 149, 157, 120 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1954); accord, Bishop v.
Bishop, 257 N.Y. 40, 51-52, 177 N.E. 302, 305-06 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.).
In addition, section 9-1.1 does not empower the courts to adopt a cy pres approach,
that is, "to alter or shave down an invalid limitation to conform as closely as possible with
the grantor's or settler's intention (while at the time complying with the perpetuity pe-
riod)." N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1, commentary at 169 (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981). If, however, a trust can be severed into a primary trust (a trust presently in
force), and secondary trusts (conditional alternatives of a remainder), with the validity of
the primary trust established, the court will suspend judgment on the validity of the secon-
dary trusts until the primary trust terminates. See, e.g., In re Will of Mount, 107 App. Div.
1, 7-8, 95 N.Y.S. 490, 491 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd per curiam, 185 N.Y. 162, 167-68, 77 N.E.
999, 1000-01 (1906).
4" The statute grants a period of gestation in addition to the lives in being and 21 years.
See N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1967). A "life in being" is defined
to include a child "conceived before creation of the estate but born thereafter." Id. There-
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tary trust or interest is created at the death of the testator, the
"measuring lives" must be those which were in being at the testa-
tor's death44 and as provided in section 9-1.1(b) of the EPTL, such
lives cannot "be so designated as to make proof of their end unrea-
sonably difficult. '45
The most common violation of the rule occurs when a trust is
created to pay funds to the testator's children for life and then to
the grandchildren for life, with the remainder usually vesting in
the great-grandchildren or their issue. A problem which typically
arises in this regard is that, either conceivably or actually, some of
these grandchildren may not be alive at the time of the testator's
death, the starting point of the permissible period. While their in-
come interests would vest within the permissible period, that is,
within 21 years after the death of their parents (who are children
of the testator and therefore lives in being at testator's death), the
vesting of the remainder in the great-grandchildren could conceiv-
ably take place beyond the permissible period (at the death of a
grandchild who was not a life in being at the testator's death).46
fore, a person can be "in being" if, when the testator died, they were begotten but not born.
L. Simzs & A. SMrrH, supra note 37, § 1224, at 112. A second manifestation of this principle
is that the donee of the future interest may be born as late as 9 months after a "life in
being" plus 21 years. Id. Finally, the posthumous child must be actual, that is, the 9 months
cannot be a period in gross. Id.
44 Although the measuring lives may be those of complete strangers to the trust objects,
In re Estate of Friedman, 67 Misc. 2d 304, 307, 323 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
County 1971), they must be human lives, In re Estate of Mills, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (Sur.
Ct. Queens County 1952). Hence, the lives of animals and of corporations are not proper
measuring lives. 45 N.Y. Jun. Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 31, at 157 (1973).
" The statute does not limit the number of measuring lives, 45 N.Y. Jur. Perpetuities
and Restraints on Alienation § 31, at 158 (1973), but does provide that the lives cannot "be
so designated as to make proof of their end unreasonably difficult." N.Y. EsT., Powzs &
TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1967). Accordingly, it has been held that seven lives is not
unreasonable. See In re Cary, 25 Misc. 2d 727, 730, 204 N.Y.S. 334, 338 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1960); accord, In re Will of Getty, 201 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
County 1960) (five "lives in being" not violative). See generally L. SimES & A. SMITH, supra
note 37, § 1223.
46 The measuring lives must be in being at the death of the testator; it is not enough
that they merely come into being within the permissible period. Leach, supra note 37, at
641. Professor Leach offers the following example:
Bequest 'to accumulate the income for 21 years and then to pay the income to
such of my grandchildren as shall then be living for life and upon the death of the
survivor to pay the principal to my great-grandchildren then living.' The life es-
tates to the grandchildren are valid, since they vest within 21 years; but the re-
mainders to great-grandchildren are invalid.
Id. It is to be assumed for purposes of the above that the testator had children at his death
and that other grandchildren possibly would be born, for if not, the grandchildren would be
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Moreover, the interest of each grandchild born after the testator's
death will run afoul of the unlawful suspension of the power of
alienation since, during the course of that grandchild's life, there
may be no other person alive who was a life in being at the testa-
tor's death. The power of alienation would then be suspended be-
yond lives in being at the time of the creation of the trust.
While the Rule Against Perpetuities is difficult to master, the
attorney-draftsman effectively can avoid an unwitting violation of
the rule by inserting a "savings clause" into the will. Such a clause
may be structured as follows:
Anything in this article to the contrary notwithstanding, no trust
created hereunder shall endure (if it has not previously termi-
nated) beyond 21 years after the death of the last trust benefi-
ciary hereunder (or name the person) who was alive at the time of
my death. All remaining principal and undistributed income of
such trusts shall be paid to [name of residuary legatee]. 7
The practitioner should also be aware of an important change
which has occurred in the law governing trusts. The rule against
unlawful suspension of alienation has been greatly relaxed since
the amendment of section 7-1.5(a)(1) of the EPTL. 8 Prior to Sep-
tember 1, 1973, all income interests in trusts were given statutory
spendthrift protection. 9 The statute now provides that an income
the lives in being and the bequest to the great-grandchildren would be valid. Id. at 641 n.5.
47 The clause discussed in text effectively "saves" the trust by presenting an immedi-
ately available outlet for funds which are the subject of dispute. Alternatively, a savings
clause may provide for the appointment of a corporate donee to distribute the funds "in
such a manner as to approximate the intention of [the testator]." Leach & Logan, Perpetu-
ities: A Standard Saving Clause to Avoid Violations of the Rule, 74 H-Lv. L. Rzv. 1141,
1141 (1961). Another form of savings clause provides that any interest violative of the Rule
Against Perpetuities "shall be reformed by the court, within permissible limits, to conform
most closely to the intention of the creator of the interest." Id. at 1146 (discussing clause
proffered by Mr. Owen Tudor of the Boston bar). For additional techniques worthy of
consideration, see Comment, Trusts-Unlawful Suspension of Power of Aliena-
tion-Construction to Avoid Invalidity by Use of Doctrines of Separability and Excision in
New York, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (1957).
48 See N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5(a)(1) (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1980-
1981).
"9 A "spendthrift" trust is one which can be neither assigned by a beneficiary nor
reached by the beneficiary's creditors. G.G. BOrERT & G.T. BOrERT, supra note 37, § 221, at
375; A. ScoTT, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 151 (1960). The purpose of such a
trust, and the apparent reason for its label, is to protect a beneficiary against self-imposed
misfortune. Id. The earlier provision of the EPTL accorded ipso facto spendthrift protection
to any beneficiary of an express trust, see N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5, com-
mentary at 71 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981), by providing, "[tihe right.., to receive the
income from property and apply it to the use of or pay it to any person may not be trans-
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beneficiary may not transfer or assign his or her interest in the
trust "unless a power to transfer such right, or any part thereof, is
conferred upon such beneficiary by the instrument creating or de-
claring the trust. '5 Thus, while New York remains a "spendthrift
trust" state, the spendthrift protection easily may be waived by
the trust settlor.5 1 Accordingly, whereas previously a problem con-
cerning unlawful suspension of the power of alienation could void
the trust, today the very existence of a power to alienate will obvi-
ate that problem.52 Thus, another means to avoid a violation of the
Rule Against Perpetuities would be for the draftsman to insert an
alienation in the trust, assuming the grant of such a power com-
ports with the testator's wishes.53
The Merger Problem
The doctrine of merger, which arises when the entire legal and
beneficial interest in a trust is vested in the same person," is an-
ferred by assignment or otherwise," id. § 7-1.5(a)(1) (McKinney 1967).
50 N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUSTS LAw § 7-1.5(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). The
original version of this section granted automatic spendthrift protection. As a result of the
1973 amendment, the settlor is free to grant a beneficiary the power to transfer his right to
receive trust income. Id., commentary at 71 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). In short, where a
settlor previously could not, as a matter of law, make trust income interests alienable, he
can now do so by providing for such power in the instrument. See id. at 71-72. For the
current status of spendthrift trusts in the various states, see G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT,
supra note 37, § 222, at 408-38 & n.94.
51 L. SImEs & A. SmrTH, supra note 37, § 1419, at 272; see, e.g., Kalish v. Kalish, 166
N.Y. 368, 372-73, 59 N.E. 917, 919 (1901).
512 See N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 7-1.5, commentary at 74 (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981) ("[i]f these interests are readily alienable by the income beneficiaries, they
should be treated as alienable for perpetuity purposes"); L. SIMEs & A. SmrH, supra note
37, § 1419, at 272 ("[i]f... the trustee or the beneficiary or the settlor or any other ascer-
tained person or group of persons have the power to terminate the trust and pass an abso-
lute interest in the subject matter, then the trust does not suspend the absolute power of
alienation").
53 For further suggestions to ensure nonviolation of the rule, see Leach, supra note 37,
at 669-71.
5 The doctrine of merger mandates that there can be no trust when a single individual
has the entire legal and beneficial interest of such trust. See Des Moines Terminal Co. v.
Des Moines Union Ry., 52 F.2d 616, 633 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 537 (1931); RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 99(5) (1959).
The statute governing the merger doctrine in the trust field is section 7-21 of the New
York Estates, Powers & Trust Law which provides that when an express trust is created, it
vests the entire legal estate in the trustee subject only to the execution of the trust. N.Y.
EST., PowEus & TRUSTS LAw § 7-2.1 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1981-1982). The beneficiary
of the income receives only an equitable interest, that is, the right to enforce the trust. Id.
When these two interests are vested in one person at the creation of the trust, there is a
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other fertile source of drafting errors. The problem occurs when
one person is named both sole income beneficiary and sole trustee.
Should this be done when the trust is created, there can be no
valid trust and the owner of the beneficial interest will take the
principal outright, free of the trust.55
It must be emphasized that merger is a problem only if it
arises at the creation of the trust. If one person should become
both the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary due to circumstances
occurring after the trust has been created, a merger does not neces-
sarily follow to invalidate the trust. For example, assume that ini-
tially two trustees are appointed in the will, one as the sole benefi-
ciary and the other as a nonbeneficiary cotrustee. If the non-
beneficiary cotrustee subsequently dies, the problem of merger
arises. The problem may be resolved, however, by ascertaining
whether the testator intended to continue the trust rather than
convert the trust interest to an outright disposition."" If the testa-
tor's intention was to continue the trust, the court will honor it by
merger sufficient to nullify the trust.
55 When the positions of sole trustee and sole beneficiary are, in a sense, "merged" into
one person, a valid trust cannot be created. The very nature of a trust contemplates one
person holding property for the benefit of another. Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N.Y. 304, 310, 90
N.E. 969, 971 (1910); see Reed v. Browne, 295 N.Y. 184, 189, 66 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1946). This is
the general rule in New York and in most jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the New York rule
varies somewhat from the general rule in other jurisdictions. In New York, when a person is
named as sole trustee with directions that all the income of the trust go to him during his
life, with the remainder to another at the trustee's death, the courts have held that a merger
occurs. See Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N.Y. 304, 311, 90 N.E. 969, 971 (1910). In the majority of
jurisdictions, however, the titles do not completely merge and the trust continues for the
benefit of the successive beneficiaries as intended by the testator. See 2 A. ScOrr, THE LAw
OF TRUSTS § 99.3 (3d ed. 1967). It is submitted that the New York rule is unsound since "for
all practical purposes, the courts will preserve all of the rights which the remainderman
would have if the trust were.., valid." N.Y. SURE. CT. PROC. ACT § 1502, commentary at
116 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N.Y. 304, 311, 90 N.E. 969, 971
(1910).
56 See, e.g., In re Will of Phipps, 2 N.Y.2d 105, 108-09, 138 N.E.2d 341, 343, 157
N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (1956). In Phipps, the testator named a friend and his wife as cotrustees of
certain income producing real property with the benefits going to the wife. The friend died,
leaving the wife as sole trustee and sole beneficiary. Although the testator's brother peti-
tioned the Surrogate's Court to be named as successor trustee, the widow maintained that a
merger of her legal and equitable life estate had occurred, leaving no trust to which a suc-
cessor trustee could be appointed. Id. at 108, 138 N.E.2d at 343, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 16. Noting
that the testator had authorized his trustees "or their successor or successors" to sell, mort-
gage, or lease the property, the court concluded that the death or removal of one of the
trustees named by him was not to operate as an extinguishment of the trust. Id. at 108-09,
138 N.E.2d at 343-44, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18; see G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAw OF
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 129 (2d ed. 1965).
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appointing an additional trustee.57 Of course, the merger pitfall
easily may be avoided by providing, in the will, for additional
trustees and successors to serve in the place of a trustee who for
any reason is incapable of acting.58
Attorney-Draftsman Named as Beneficiary: The Putnam Problem
Testators' intentions frequently are confounded not by draft-
ing errors per se, but rather, by the poor judgment of an attorney-
draftsman. Such is the nature of the Putnam problem, so named
57 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROc. AcT § 1502(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) provides:
The court may appoint a trustee or successor or successors or co-trustee or co-
trustees whenever there is no trustee able to act or all or one of the trustees is
unable to act and a successor or co-trustee in his or their place is necessary in
order to execute the trust or execute any power created by a will or lifetime trust
instrument creating a trust, the execution of which has devolved upon the court or
upon the supreme court.
Id. This provision empowers the court to appoint an additional trustee even though the will
does not authorize such appointment. Therefore, to prevent the destruction of the trust by
operation of law, the court may appoint a cotrustee. N.Y. Sum. CT. PROC. ACT § 1502,
commentary at 580 (McKinney 1967). The power effectively may render the merger problem
obsolete. In In re Estate of Seidman, 88 Misc. 2d 462, 389 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1976), aff'd, 58 App. Div. 2d 72, 395 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1977), Judge Sobel
concluded that "the doctrine of 'merger' no longer exists as applied to modem testamentary
trusts." 88 Misc. 2d at 470-71, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 736. In that case, a widow, as decedent's
executrix, petitioned for construction of her husband's will, contending that a residuary
trust created for her benefit was, by operation of law, an outright disposition because she
was both sole income beneficiary and sole trustee. The court rejected the application of the
merger doctrine, noting that it has led to absurd results. Id. at 469, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
Judge Sobel, relying upon In re Will of Phipps, 2 N.Y.2d 105, 108-09, 138 N.E.2d 341, 343,
157 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (1956), reasoned that "no testator intends that a trust which he has
expressly created shall be extinguished... by operation of law." 88 Misc. 2d at 471, 389
N.Y.S.2d at 736.
" There are many situations in which a testamentary trustee may become unable to
act. Among these are: death of the trustee before execution of the trust; an instrument in
writing renouncing the appointment as trustee; decree of the surrogate's court removing or
allowing a trustee to resign; and lunacy, illness, or other incapacitation. 2B WARREN'S HEA-
TON, supra note 12, § 201, (2)-(3); see N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. ACT § 707 (McKinney 1967).
It appears that the impact of such events readily may be ameliorated by the appointment of
additional or successor trustees. See In re Will of Phipps, 2 N.Y.2d 105, 108-09, 138 N.E.2d
341, 343, 157 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (1956). The actual will may provide for any number of cotrust-
ees and may enable them to appoint their own successors in the event they cannot fully
execute the trust. See, e.g., Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N.Y. 394, 405 (1855). When there is no
appointed trustee able to act, the court will use its power to appoint a successor or co-
trustee. See In re Estate of Seidman, 88 Misc. 2d 462, 471, 389 N.Y.S.2d 729, 736 (Sur. Ct.
Kings County 1976), af'd, 58 App. Div. 2d 72, 395 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1977); N.Y. SuRm
CT. PRoc. AT § 1502 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1981-1982). Reliance upon the courts' dis-
cretionary power, however, is the less desirable approach since a merger may be found ab-
sent express language in a will appointing additional trustees.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:459
because of the seminal case of In re Will of Putnam,59 wherein the
New York Court of Appeals cautioned attorneys against drafting
bequests to themselves in their clients' wills. In such situation,
stated the Putnam court, an inference arises that the attorney, be-
cause of his confidential relationship with a testator, used undue
influence to secure the bequest."'
Because section 1408 of the SCPA mandates that before the
court may admit a will to probate it must "inquire particularly
into all the facts and must [be satisfied] with the genuineness of
the will and the validity of its execution,""1 Surrogates routinely
investigate Putnam bequests, even in the absence of allegations of
undue influence. 2 The investigation or inquiry may consist simply
of an affidavit submitted by the attorney explaining the facts and
circumstances of the gift. s Such affidavit, which must explain the
circumstances of the gift to the Surrogate's satisfaction, is particu-
larly appropriate when the bequest to the attorney-draftsman is
not disproportionate to the estate as a whole.64 If, however, the gift
8' 257 N.Y. 140, 177 N.E. 399 (1931).
60 Id. at 143, 177 N.E. at 400. In Putnam, the will of the testatrix was admitted to
probate over the objections of the only living relative, the testatrix's much adored niece. Id.
at 142, 177 N.E. at 400. Previous wills had evidenced that it was the textatrix's intention to
leave all of the income from her estate to her niece for life. This also was true of the con-
tested will. In the previous wills, however, the residuary estate had been left to charity
while, in the disputed will, the residuary estate was left to the attorney who drew the instru-
ment. Id. at 143, 177 N.E. at 400. Therefore, the niece contested the will on the ground of
undue influence. Id. Judge Crane, in a unanimous opinion in which Judges Cardozo and
Lehman joined, affirmed the finding of the surrogates court that there had been no undue
influence. Many evidentiary questions were presented by the case and it was upon those
matters that the case turned. The court made it clear, however, that the attorney had
caused "all the trouble" and cautioned that attorney-draftsman bequests should be avoided.
Id.
61 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT § 1408(1) (McKinney 1967). This provision mandates that
the court inquire into the facts necessary to prove the will. The court, however, may use its
discretion as to the extent of its inquiry. Id., commentary at 226 (McKinney 1967); e.g., In
re Estate of Hayes, 49 Misc. 2d 152, 153, 267 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County
1966).
62 The late Surrogate S. Samuel DiFalco of New York County stated that his court
dealt with thirty Putnam cases per month. DiFalco, Pitfalls in Confidential Relationships
and Observations on Privileged Communications, N.Y.L.J., May 24, 1967, at 4, col. 2. Hav-
ing presided at Putnam hearings while Law Assistant Referee, this author can only believe
the number given was a misprint. Thirty Putnam cases per year is the more likely figure,
based upon approximately 4,500 probates annually.
63 Use of attorney affidavits is the practice in the Westchester County Surrogate's
Court. Other courts, however, uniformly hold hearings when Putnam questions arise. See In
re Estate of Eckert, 93 Misc. 2d 677, 681, 403 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (Sur. Ct. New York County
1978).
" See, e.g., In re Will of Moskowitz, 279 App. Div. 660, 660, 107 N.Y.S.2d 853, 853-54
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is of an inordinate amount or if the Surrogate is not satisfied with
the proffered explanation, a Putnam hearing will be held. This
hearing usually is conducted before a law assistant referee who ex-
amines the attorney in the presence of interested parties or their
counsel.6 5 A transcript of the proceeding is made and presented to
the Surrogate for his review, but the hearing is essentially infor-
mal. Thus, the rules of evidence are not strictly applied.6 As a
matter of courtesy and as an aid to the court, interested parties or
their counsel are permitted to question the attorney-draftsman.
While adhering to the informal nature of the Putnam hearing,
some courts conduct the procedure with a few more formalities. In
Westchester and Nassau counties, for example, the Surrogate signs
a formal order designating one of his law assistants as a referee
under section 506 of the SCPA 7 The referee, upon completing an
(2d Dep't 1951). In Moskowitz, the attorney-son of the decedent assisted in the drafting of
the will, under which the estate was bequeathed equally to himself and another son, but to
the exclusion of a daughter. In reversing the denial of probate, the court held that, under
these circumstances, it was essential for undue influence to be proved. Id.
" But see Trial Transcript at 14, In re Will of Poisnett (Sur. Ct. Queens County July
11, 1979), where Surrogate Laurino of Queens County personally presided at the Putnam
hearing.
"But see Trial Transcript at 14, In re Will of Poisnett (Sur. Ct. Queens County July
11, 1979). There, Surrogate Laurino, in an uncontested probate proceeding, sustained an
objection under N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAw § 4519 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-1982) to the
testimony of the attorney regarding his relationship with the decedent and the circum-
stances surrounding the Putnam bequest. The author is not aware of any'other Surrogates
who have followed this evidentiary procedure. For a discussion of section 4519 of the New
York Civil Practices Law, see note 71 infra.
67 N.Y. Sum CT. PROC. Aar § 506(1) (McKinney 1967). Section 506(1) provides:
In any proceeding other than one instituted for probate of a will or where a con-
stitutional right to trial by jury exists and is demanded, the court may appoint a
referee to report to the court upon the facts or upon a specific question of fact or
upon the law and the facts. The report of the referee shall be filed and contain the
facts found and the conclusions of law. No exceptions need be filed to the report.
Id. (emphasis added). While section 506 specifically excludes a probate proceeding, Surro-
gates nonetheless routinely employ this section, rather than SCPA § 1408, for the appoint-
ment of a referee. See note 61 supra. The referee, of course, is the equivalent of an advisory
jury. The court may accept or reject his report and may make new findings. N.Y. SURR. CT.
PROC. AcT § 506, commentary at 449 (McKinney 1967). The purpose of a referee is to con-
serve the Surrogate's time on involved questions of fact which would congest the calendar.
The referee, therefore, is given all the powers of a court and acts as a Surrogate with respect
to the referred issues. In re Estate of Smith, 3 Misc. 2d 642, 643, 149 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126
(Sur. Ct. Kings County 1956). The Surrogate will not disturb the referee's findings of fact
unless there is some clear error. In re Estate of Winsweiler, 146 Misc. 436, 436-37, 262
N.Y.S. 383, 383-84 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1933).
Notably, a 1971 amendment to section 506 added subdivision (6), which allows an attor-
ney on the court's staff, such as a clerk or law assistant, to take testimony in any proceeding
other than one where a right to trial by jury exists. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoc. AcT § 506(6)
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informal factfinding procedure, drafts a formal report. 8
Usually, the procedure will terminate once the Surrogate ren-
ders a formal decision. If, however, the court determines that the
gift appears tainted, it will schedule a formal hearing at which time
it will either sustain the gift or, if the gift is of the entire estate or
a major portion thereof, it will reject the will." When the gift to
the attorney involves only a portion of the testamentary estate, the
court may grant partial probate by merely excising the offensive
portion of the will and admitting the balance to probate."0
Any difficulty thus far encountered by the attorney-draftsman
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
'0 While the court must always be satisfied as to the genuiness of the will and the
validity of its execution, the Surrogate, pursuant to his authority under section 1408 of the
SCPA, may avoid the formal reference procedure by accepting affidavits pursuant to section
1406 of the SCPA. Such affidavits may be taken by any officer authorized to administer
oaths. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT §§ 1406(1), 1408(1) (McKinney 1967); cf. In re Estate of
Leitstein, 46 Misc. 2d 656, 657, 260 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1965) (attes-
tation clause used in lieu of affidavit). But see In re Estate of Eckert, 93 Misc. 2d 677, 681,
403 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1978). Notably, in Eckert, Surrogate
Midonick stated "[t]he Surrogate's Court, New York County, has in practice instituted the
requirement of a full 'Putnam hearing' in place of the submission of affidavits before a will
in which an attorney-draftsman receives a legacy of substance can be admitted to probate."
Id.
69 See In re Estate of Hayes, 49 Misc. 2d 152, 153, 267 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1966). In Hayes, an 80-year-old testatrix left her entire estate to the attor-
ney-draftsman and his son, to the exclusion of the natural objects of her bounty. Id. The
court rejected the will in its entirety, reasoning that in the absence of an adequate explana-
tion by the attorney it was compelled to hold that the testatrix was subject to undue influ-
ence. Id.; see In re Will of Zimmerman, 254 App. Div. 630, 630, 3 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (4th
Dep't 1938).
70 See, e.g., In re Estate of Lawson, 75 App. Div. 2d 20, 29-30, 428 N.Y.S.2d 106, 112
(4th Dep't 1980). In Lawson, a $20,000 bequest was made to the attorney-draftsman out of
an estate of $150,000. While the court agreed with the Surrogate's finding of undue influ-
ence as to that bequest, it believed that expunging the specific bequest and submitting the
remainder of the will to probate would be equitable and consistent with the intent of the
testatrix. Id. at 29, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 111. Since the jury had rejected the entire will on undue
influence grounds, however, the appellate court remanded to the surrogate's court for con-
sideration of whether the undue influence of an attorney-draftsman should cause only his
bequest to be invalidated. Id. at 29-30, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
A part of a will may be rejected in the probate decree on the ground of undue influence
when it is clearly severable from other parts not so tainted. In re Will of McCaffrey, 105
Misc. 433, 443, 173 N.Y.S. 392, 397 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1918); see In re Will of Wein-
stock, 78 Misc. 2d 182, 187, 355 N.Y.S.2d 966, 972 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1974), aff'd as
modified, 47 App. Div. 2d 542, 363 N.Y.S.2d 104 (2d Dep't 1975), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351
N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976). The portion of the will that is excised may be distrib-
uted proportionately among the residuary legatees pursuant to section 3-3.4 of the EPIL.
In re Estate of Eckert, 93 Misc. 2d 677, 683, 403 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (Sur. Ct. New York
County 1978).
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may be compounded if, during the court's investigation, an inter-
ested party files an objection to the will based upon the attorney's
alleged undue influence in securing the legacy. In such a case, the
court will suspend its inquiry and let the probate take its course as
a contested proceeding. A major problem confronted by the attor-
ney in such a proceeding is the Dead Man's Statute, found in sec-
tion 4519 of the CPLR.7 1 Upon objection by an interested party,
the attorney will be precluded from testifying on his own behalf to
remove the cloud of suspicion and to establish the gift. Invocation
of the statute poses a dilemma to the attorney for, although he
may be asked to explain the circumstances of the gift, the law may
prevent him from so testifying.72 Whenever possible, the attorney
71 At common law, the Dead Man's Statute rendered witnesses who were "parties to the
suit or pecuniarily interested in the event thereof" incompetent to testify. W. RICHARDSON,
LAw OF EVImENCE § 386 (10th ed. R. Prince 1973) [hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON]. Pres-
ently, all persons interested in the event are competent to testify by virtue of N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 4512 (McKinney 1963), although the witnesses' interest may still be shown in
order to attack his credibility. RicHARDSON, supra, § 395. One exception to section 4512 is
found in the "Dead Man's Statute," N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4519 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1981-1982), which provides that when there is an interested party, such person is incompe-
tent to testify in his own behalf to unwritten transactions or communications with a de-
ceased or mentally ill person. Id. The purpose of section 4519 is to preclude any unfair
advantage had by the living witness. Therefore, "where death [or insanity] silences one the
law will silence the other." In re Estate of Erdmann, 198 Misc. 1087, 1091, 98 N.Y.S.2d 111,
114 (Sur. Ct. Richmond County 1950). See generally Note, Disqualification of Witness as to
Transactions with Decedent or Lunatic-Recent Exception, 22 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 310
(1948).
The protection afforded by section 4519 may be waived expressly, Dean v. Halliburton,
241 N.Y. 354, 361-62, 150 N.E. 141, 143-44 (1925), or impliedly by failing to object to the
proffered testimony, In re Estate of Remlinger, 258 App. Div. 911, 911, 16 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368
(2d Dep't 1939). But see In re Will of Honigman, 8 App. Div. 2d 969, 970, 190 N.Y.S.2d 845,
847 (2d Dep't 1959) ("failure to object to [incompetent] evidence . . . does not open the
door to additional incompetent evidence"), rev'd on other grounds, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168
N.E.2d 676, 203 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1960).
72 Since the Putnam situation does not fall within any exception to the Dead Man's
Statute, the attorney will not be permitted to explain his legacy under the contested will.
An objection to testimony by the attorney relating to conversations and transactions with
the testator must be sustained even though the attorney is bound to comply with the Put-
nam rule. Estate Administration-Problems in Practice and Procedure-Will Contests, 8
N.Y.L.F. 360, 379-80 (1962) (statements of Surrogate DiFalco). Of course, the statute is
waived when the executor testifies in his own behalf concerning a personal transaction with
the deceased or when the testimony of the deceased concerning the same transaction is
entered into evidence. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4519 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-1982).
Hence, the interested witness will be able to testify as to that transaction. In re Estate of
Christie, 167 Misc. 484, 492, 4 N.Y.S.2d 484, 494 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1938). Such testi-
mony must be strictly confined to the same transaction or communication. The adverse
party may not testify as to any other independent transaction with the deceased. Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Prescott & Son, Inc., 139 Misc. 603, 609, 249 N.Y.S. 6, 14 (Sup. Ct. Clinton
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should testify on his own behalf rather than remain mute." In-
deed, the attorney has an affirmative duty to show the propriety of
the gift,"' and if no evidence or explanation is offered on his behalf,
the law will infer or even presume wrongdoing.7 5
Another practical problem facing the attorney is the loss of
any settlement option. While, normally, every litigated case has a
settlement value, the attorney possessed of a Putnam bequest may
be reluctant to settle for fear that any compromise would be con-
strued as a concession of wrongdoing. Moreover, even if the matter
eventually is settled by the parties, the proceeding will thereupon
County 1931), aff'd mem., 235 App. Div. 878, 257 N.Y.S. 900 (3d Dep't 1932). This exception
is not to be confused with the case in which a party or interested witness is examined by the
adverse party concerning a personal transaction with the deceased. Such examination does
not "open the door" for that witness to testify in his own behalf concerning the same trans-
action. In re West, 252 App. Div. 919, 919, 300 N.Y.S. 146, 148 (4th Dep't 1937). Rather, the
principle to be applied in such situations is the rule of evidence where a party examines a
witness as to a particular part of a communication or transaction thereby allowing the other
party to elicit the whole communication or transaction to further explain or qualify the
communication or transaction. In re Estate of Anooshian, 13 App. Div. 2d 626, 626-27, 213
N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (lst Dep't 1961) (per curiam). Such an occurrence would be deemed a
waiver of the disqualification to that extent.
1 See In re Estate of Hayes, 49 Misc. 2d 152, 153, 267 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453-54 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1966). In Hayes, both the attorney-draftsman and the contestants rested af-
ter the proponent-the attorney's son-completed his prima facie case without offering any
additional proof concerning the propriety of the gift. The court observed:
In view of the rule laid down in the Putnam case, it is the opinion of this court
that, in addition to the factum of the will, it was incumbent upon the attorney
draftsman to come forward and explain the circumstances under which he became
a principal beneficiary of the decedents will; and to show that no unfair advan-
tage was taken of his client and that the alleged gift was freely and willingly made.
Id. at 153, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 454 (citations omitted) (Surrogate McGrath presiding).
14 Although the burden of proving undue influence lies with the contestant of a will, the
attorney-draftsman has the affirmative "burden of satisfying the court that the will...
[reflects] the free, untrammeled and intelligent expresson of the wishes and intention of the
testatrix." In re Will of Smith, 95 N.Y. 516, 523 (1884); see In re Estate of Smith, 170 Misc.
572, 578, 10 N.Y.S.2d 775, 780 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939).
71 When the attorney-draftsman is named as a beneficiary under the will the courts
have variously described the existence of undue influence as a presumption, In re Will of
Connor, 230 App. Div. 163, 165, 244 N.Y.S. 221, 223 (3d Dep't 1930), an inference, In re
Estate of Eckert, 93 Misc. 2d 677, 680, 403 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (Sur. Ct. New York County
1978), or a suspicion, In re Will of Little, 45 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (Sur. Ct. Queens County
1943). In In re Estate of Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976), the
New York Court of Appeals referred to the "rule that a bequest to an attorney-dratsman
[sic] gives rise to an inference or perhaps a presumption of undue influence." Id. at 6 n.*,
351 N.E.2d at 649 n.*, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 3 n.* (1976) (emphasis added). Regardless of the
characterization, the attorney who drafts the will must explain the circumstances surround-
ing the bequest. In re Will of Putnam, 257 N.Y. 140, 143, 177 N.E. 399, 400 (1931). See
generally Note, Attorney Beware-The Presumption of Undue Influence and the Attor-
ney-Beneficiary, 47 NoTPE DAME LAW. 330 (1971).
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revert to an uncontested proceeding wherein the Surrogate must
still "be satisfied with the genuineness of the will and the validity
of its execution" before he may admit the will to probate."8 Ac-
cordingly, the examination of the attorney by the court or its rep-
resentative may continue, depending on how far the proceeding
went in this respect while the contest was pending.
Of course, all of the aforementioned Putnam-related inquiries
may be forestalled by one simple measure. As noted by Judge
Crane in Putnam, "[a]ttorneys for clients who intend to leave
them or their families a bequest would do well to have the will
drawn by some other lawyer. '7 7 As a practical matter, however, an
attorney who has prepared a complicated estate plan for a wealthy
client may fear that he will not receive a bequest should the client
seek the aid of another attorney.78 In such a situation, it may be
advisable for the attorney to draw the client's will, but without any
"tainted" legacy to the attorney. Thereafter, the attorney should
recommend that the client retain another attorney to draft a codi-
cil effectuating the gift.79 Thus, the estate plan, as well as the gift,
76 N.Y. SuaR. CT. PROc. AcT § 1408(1) (McKinney 1967).
77 In re Will of Putnam, 257 N.Y. 140, 143, 177 N.E. 399, 400 (1931) (citations omitted).
The attorney is advised to follow the ethical guidelines offered by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be made to himself or for
his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to
the charge that he unduly influenced or over-reached the client. If a client volun-
tarily offers to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before
doing so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested advice from an inde-
pendent, competent person who is cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than
in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which
his client desires to name him beneficially be prepared by another lawyer se-
lected by the client.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsBmrrY, EC 5-5 (1979) (emphasis added).
78 There is an anecdote the author uses to demonstrate the need to guard against fool-
ishness by the attorney in this area. A little old, but quite wealthy lady, calls upon a large
law firm to draw her will. After a lengthy will has been prepared she insists that the attor-
ney insert his name as legatee of $5,000. The attorney mildly protests and the testatrix
persists. The attorney complies and then the docile, little lady inquires of the firm's fee. He
protests-how can he charge her after she has been so kind? After executing the will, she
thanks him and takes the will home. She then removes the last page, rewrites the same
minus the attorney's legacy, and has the will reexecuted. The result is a free will. Caveat
avocatus.
79 A codicil is a supplement to an existing will which must be executed with all the
formalities of a will. Any number of codicils may be appended to a will which add to, sup-
plement, alter, qualify, modify, or revoke the will provisions. Upon the will's probate, all of
the writings must be read together as one instrument. In re Will of Mucklow, 242 App. Div.
111, 114, 272 N.Y.S. 776, 780 (3d Dep't 1934); In re Will of Phelps, 133 Misc. 450, 452, 232
1982]
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would be preserved.
Joint and Reciprocal Wills
Although like Putnam bequests, the drafting of joint and re-
ciprocal wills is not per se unfounded, good judgment dictates that
such wills should be avoided. Joint and reciprocal wills are instru-
ments signed by two testators, usually husband and wife, in which
each bequeaths his or her entire estate to the survivor, and on the
survivor's death the assets are bequeathed to certain persons, usu-
ally their children. 0
These wills are problematic because of their legal conse-
quences. Immediately upon executing joint or reciprocal wills, the
parties are deemed to have eitered into a formal contract which
provides for the disposition of their property just as effectively as
if they had done so in a separately drawn instrument. 1 Although
the joint will is entirely executory during the lives of both parties,82
N.Y.S. 418, 421 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1929).
80 A joint will is one in which two persons execute their respective wills in a single
instrument. T. ATKNSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WnLs 222 (2d ed. 1953). Because it is
regarded as the will of each person, it is probated twice. See W. CASEY, FoRms OF WILLS,
TRUSTS AND F Lmy AGREEmETS WrrH TAX IDEAS 116 (2d ed. 1963). Reciprocal wills, also
called mutual wills, are separate instruments in which two or more persons make reciprocal
provisions in favor of each other. See T. ATKINSON, supra, at 222. Reciprocal wills typically
contain identical provisions wherein each party devises and bequeaths all of his or her prop-
erty, both real and personal, to the other party. See W. CASEY, supra, 1 116; see, e.g., S.
GORDON, STANDARD ANNOTATED FoRMs OF WILLs 719-20 (1947). It has been argued that it is
impossible to have a will that is both joint and reciprocal, since the former contemplates a
single instrument, while the latter involves multiple instruments. See T. ATINSON, supra,
at 222. Notwithstanding this anomaly, the term "joint and mutual will" is often used to
refer to a single document. See T. ATmNSON, supra, at 223. See also 1 G. THOPSON, THE
LAW OF Wi.is § 34 (3d ed. 1947); 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1364 (1957).
81 See Glass v. Battista, 43 N.Y.2d 620, 625, 374 N.E.2d 116, 118, 403 N.Y.S.2d 204,
206-07 (1978); Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 232, 225 N.E.2d 540, 542-43, 278
N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (1967); Wagner v. Wagner, 58 App. Div. 2d 7, 10, 395 N.Y.S.2d 641,
643 (1st Dep't 1977), af'd, 44 N.Y.2d 780, 377 N.E.2d 482, 406 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1978). Upon
the death of one party, the survivor must strictly adhere to the terms of the will. Glass v.
Battista, 43 N.Y.2d at 624, 374 N.E.2d at 117, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 206. The survivor's right of
full ownership of the collective property covered in the will is transformed into a life inter-
est, and he is deemed to hold the property in trust for the beneficiaries. Rubenstein v. Muel-
ler, 19 N.Y.2d at 233-34, 225 N.E.2d at 543, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 849. The survivor is also pre-
vented from making any testamentary provision that would defeat the purpose of the
agreement.
8" In re Estate of Coffed, 59 App. Div. 2d 297, 299, 399 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (4th Dep't
1977), af'd, 46 N.Y.2d 514, 387 N.E.2d 1209, 414 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1979). Notably, joint and
reciprocal wills often are deemed irrevocable. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 80, at 224. None-
theless, the execution of the joint and reciprocal will does not in and of itself establish a
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upon the death of one, the rights and duties of the survivor
become fixed and equity will specifically enforce the will's
provisions.1s
The most significant consequence of such wills, little recog-
nized among members of the bar, is that the obligation of the sur-
vivor to faithfully dispose of his or her assets in accordance with
the terms of the joint will attaches to all of the survivor's property,
not just the property inherited from the one who predeceased.
Thus, the disposition of the wealth that the survivor may indepen-
dently accumulate before his own death will be governed by the
terms of the joint will.8 '
contract not to revoke the instrument. In re Estate of Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 909, 911, 252
N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1964). Such a contract, however, may be
found in the language of the will or the circumstances surrounding its making. Rich v. Mot-
tek, 11 N.Y.2d 90, 94, 181 N.E.2d 445, 447, 226 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431 (1962). In New York, clear
and convincing evidence is necessary to establish a contract to make a will irrevocable. Es-
tate of Opal v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 154, 158 (1970), affl'd, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971).
Once established, the agreement is controlled by the principles of contract law. In re Estate
of Coffed, 59 App. Div. 2d 297, 299, 399 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (4th Dep't 1977), afl'd, 46 N.Y.2d
514, 387 N.E.2d 1209, 414 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1979).
83 See In re Estate of Coffed, 59 App. Div. 2d 297, 299, 399 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550-51 (4th
Dep't 1977), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 514, 387 N.E.2d 1209, 414 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1979). When one
party dies and the survivor accepts the benefits of the joint and reciprocal will, the survivor
is no longer free to dispose of the property as he or she sees fit. Id. In addition, the survivor
cannot circumvent the agreement by making gifts in lieu of a testamentary disposition, so-
called "Totten Trusts." In re Estate of Hassan, 98 Misc. 2d 80, 82-83, 413 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276
(Sur. Ct. Bronx -County 1979). Surrogate Gelfand of Bronx County stated the concept suc-
cinctly. "The essence of a joint will involves a contract between two parties that whatever
they may possess at the time of their respective deaths, they will leave in accordance with
the testamentary instrument which they are jointly executing by which they agree to be
contractually bound." Id.
" See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 233-34, 225 N.E.2d 540, 543-44, 278
N.Y.S.2d 845, 849 (1967). This obligation includes property which the survivor may have
inherited by means other than from the joint will, such as joint bank accounts and real
property held as tenants by the entirety. Id. The surviving testator, however, is under no
obligation to accumulate income from the property acquired through the joint will or other-
wise and may do whatever he wishes with any income generated. Di Loreno v. Ciancio, 49
App. Div. 2d 756, 758, 373 N.Y.S.2d 167, 171 (2d Dep't 1975). Specific property mentioned
in the joint and reciprocal will may not be transferred to meet the daily needs of the surviv-
ing testator. Schwartz v. Horn, 31 N.Y.2d 275, 280, 290 N.E.2d 816, 819, 338 N.Y.S.2d 613,
616 (1972). Good faith is the test in determining whether property may be transferred. See
Dickinson v. Seaman, 193 N.Y. 18, 24-25, 85 N.E. 818, 820 (1908). A provision may be in-
cluded in the original agreement limiting the survivor's use of property only to the extent of
its value at the time of the decedent's death. This is an extraordinary interpretation, how-
ever, and absent a clear indication that it represents the intention of the parties, courts are
not likely to adopt it. See In re Estate of Wiggins, 45 App. Div. 2d 604, 607, 360 N.Y.S.2d
129, 133 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 791, 350 N.E.2d 618, 385 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1974). Even
codicils which recognize the primary purpose of the original will and only attempt to effec-
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Another negative aspect of joint or reciprocal wills is the loss
of the marital deduction under both federal and New York estate
tax laws. 5 The taxing authorities have held that upon the death of
one party to a joint will, the survivor merely takes the equivalent
of a legal life estate; the disposition thereby becomes tainted with
a "terminable interest." There is no absolute power of disposition
and, thus, the survivor's interest will fail to qualify for the marital
deduction. Accordingly, as a sine qua non to the creation of a joint
or reciprocal will, the prudent lawyer should carefully explain to
his client the resulting loss of the marital deduction. 8
Litigation in this area arises when the survivor, who has
reaped the benefits of the joint will upon the death of the spouse,
remarries and makes different testamentary arrangements. If, for
example, the survivor makes a second will which leaves his estate
to his new spouse, the children from the first marriage may suc-
cessfully sue to enforce the first will in their capacity as third party
beneficiaries.8 7
tuate minor changes, prompted by the increase in the size of the estate over a lengthy inter-
val separating the two deaths, may not be justified. 45 App. Div. 2d at 607, 360 N.Y.S.2d at
133.
85 Estate of Opal v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 154, 166 (1970), aff'd, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir.
1971). The marital deduction, in both federal and New York state jurisdictions, allows the
surviving spouse to deduct from the value of the taxable estate an amount equal to the
value of any interest in property which passes from the decedent to his spouse. See 26
U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1976); N.Y. TAX LAW § 249-s(3)(a) (McKinney 1966). Generally, the trans-
fer from decedent to spouse must be absolute and not terminable, as in the case of a life
estate, in order to qualify for the deduction. See 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(1) (1976); N.Y. TAX
LAW § 249-s(3)(b)(1) (McKinney 1966). The practitioner should note, however, that under
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, a life estate with income to the surviving spouse
and remainder to others may qualify for the now unlimited marital deduction. Act of Aug.
13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)(1), (d)(1), 95 Stat. 301 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §
2056(b)(7)). For a discussion of the new federal provisions regarding the marital deduction,
see ANALYSIS OF THF ECONoMIc RECOVERY TAX AcT OF 1981 (Matthew Bender Co. 1981).
" The marital deduction routinely is rejected by the courts once a contract not to re-
voke a joint and reciprocal will has been established. See, e.g., Dekker v. United States, 245
F. Supp. 255, 256 (S.D. 11. 1965); In re Estate of Ryan, 61 Misc. 2d 390, 392, 305 N.Y.S.2d
698, 700 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1969); In re Estate of Rothwacks, 57 Misc. 2d 152, 156,
290 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1968). The practioner should be aware of the
1981 federal tax provision regarding the marital deduction, see note 85 supra, which per-
mits, under certain conditions, a marital deduction even though the survivor takes only a
life estate. Whether the new provision will cause the courts to permit a marital deduction to
the surviving party to a joint will is as yet unknown. In any event, the attorney should warn
the testator of the possible loss of the deduction.
87 Glass v. Battista, 43 N.Y.2d 620, 625, 374 N.E.2d 116, 118, 403 N.Y.S.2d 204, 206-07
(1978); Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 233-34, 225 N.E.2d 5401 543, 278 N.Y.S.2d
845, 849 (1967). The Rubenstein court was divided over the question whether the second
spouse would have a right of election against the first will. In holding that she had no such
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Of course, not every joint or reciprocal will has been held to be
contractual and, therefore, sufficient to dispose of property in ac-
cordance with its terms. Indeed, such a determination will depend
upon the language of the instrument and the intention of the sign-
ing parties."" Clearly, however, joint and reciprocal wills create
more trouble than they are worth, and unless the practitioner has a
compelling reason for using such wills, he should not do so.
CONCLUSION
Will drafting unquestionably is fraught with perils which prey
upon the unwary practitioner-and testator. Perhaps more so than
in any other area of law, "[i]ts many avenues are replete with pit-
falls to be avoided and roadblocks to be overcome in order to"8
effectuate the intentions of testators. It is hoped, in this regard,
that this Article has afforded practitioners and their clients height-
ened insight into the pitfalls of will drafting so that they may act
to better effect their objectives.
right, the majority distinguished an irrevocable obligation to devise collective property from
a separation agreement, over which the spouse's right of election may take precedence. The
court reasoned that, in a separation agreement, any provision for a future legacy is only
incidental to the overall settlement of joint property and a husband's obligation to support
his children. Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d at 234, 225 N.E.2d at 544, 278 N.Y.S.2d at
850.
See In re Estate of Zeh, 24 App. Div. 2d 983, 984-85, 265 N.Y.S.2d 257, 260 (2d Dep't
1965), affl'd, 18 N.Y.2d 900, 223 N.E.2d 43, 276 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1966). In Zeh, the survivor
was given all the property passing under the will, meaning that "'the survivor.., shall be
absolute owner, to him or to her to have and to hold, his or her heirs and assigns absolutely
and forever of all that both of us possess."' 24 App. Div. 2d at 984, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 260
(emphasis added by court). The court focused upon the word "absolutely" and construed
the language to negate the existence of a limited life estate in the survivor.
Language stating that "children of the marriage take 'in the event of the death of both
of us"' was held to be a provision referring to a mutual disaster only and not an expression
of intent to make a joint will contractually binding. In re Estate of Bainer, 71 App. Div. 2d
728, 729, 419 N.Y.S.2d 228, 230 (3d Dep't 1979). The Bainer court also emphasized that the
intent to make a joint will contractually binding must be clear and not left to conjecture. Id.
89 Scheinkman, The Civil Jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals: The Rule
and Role of Finality, 54 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 443, 485 (1980).
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